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1 Introduction
One of the main features of a representative democracy with a parliamentary system is
the preeminent role that a coalition holding the majority of the votes in the Parliament
plays in the determination of policy outcomes.^ The agenda-setting power is always within
the majority coalition, and the cabinet government is limited even in the realm of executive
power by the need to maintain the support of the majority coalition itself. In other words, the
policy outcomes of a parliamentary democracy are decided de facto by the majority coalition
in the House(s). Thus, the legislative bargaining game determining the majority coalition is
a very important one for any positive theory of the micro-political determination of economic
policy (see Persson & Tabellini 1998b for the most recent account of this approach).
The players of the legislative bargaining game are usually not the individual legislators but
the electedparties.^ The numberof parties represented in the Parliament and the distribution
of seats among them affect, together with the ideological and political constraints on the
formation of different coalitions, the negotiation process that leads to the formation of a
majority coalition. But these crucial variables, i.e., the party structure and the distribution
of seats, are obviously not exogenous to the institutional system:
1. For any given party structure, the distribution of seats is affected by, and varies with,
the electoral system;
2. Within any given institutional system, the equilibrium party structure depends on
the expected assignment of seats, and hence expected payoff, associated to each party
structure.
These two relationships are very important, and have not been studied before. The in
troduction of the process of party formation in any game-theoretic model of representative
democracy allows us to deal with such relationships and is likely to determine predictions
close to reality, since party formation is one of the main strategic activities of politicians.
'Persson and Tabellini (1998a) and (1998b) cire the first to emphasize the impact of the legislative cohesion
typical of parliamentary systems on public policy, contrasting such a policy with that obtained in a presidential-
congressional system, which is diaracterized by less legislative cohesion and a greater separation of powers.
Our paper focuses exclusively on parliamentary systems, and hence legislative cohesion is assumed throughout.
Laver and Shepsle (1996) provide a rich formal model of government formation, where the emphasis is on the
"composition" of the cabinet rather than on legislative bargaining.
^In closed-list systems the electorate casts its ballot not for individual candidates but for party lists.
Moreover, the elimination of 'secret votes in the Houses of many democracies implies more discipline, or
loyalty, within parties. The party leadership can usually enforce the party line by various kinds of implicit
threats.
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Moreover, if voters know the true ideological position of any party facing elections, then,
since no contingent contract can be signed with the voters, a party is stuck with its own ideo-
lo^cal position. A political elite can commit to a policy platform different from its own only
by forming a party with some other elite, so that the platform votersexpect to be pursued by
such a party is somewhere between those of the two elites. In other words, party formation
gives political elites a way to "move" on.the policy spectrum.
One of the main contributions in the recent formal literature on representative democ
racy is the work of Besley and Coate (1997). In* the first stage of their three-stage game
some agents choose to become, candidates, in the second stage the population votes for the
candidates, aiid in the last stage the candidate who received the most votes makes policy
choices. This is a goodrabstract description of what happens when one decision maker has to
be elected, but it is not as relevant when the object of study is the formation of a coalitional
government, especially if the electoral system is proportional. In contrast to Besley and
Coate, our representative democracy game allows the consideration of a variety of electoral
systems, as well as all possible divisions'of the electorate (into districts or constituencies)
within a unified framework. For any given electoral system, the multi-stage coalition forma
tion game introduced in this paper produces an equilibrium outcome, an equilibrium party
structure, and an equilibrium government coalition: >>
- The (ex post) coalition formation game involved in. forming a coalitional government is
played all the time, in all parliamentary democracies. Even though the party structure has
been fairly stable for long periods in many countries, coalition formation before elections (ex
ante) takes place at importasnt historical- turning points, when a significant change in the
rules of the overaU game occurs (amongwhich the electoralsystem.is a crucial one), or when
the political constraints or voters' preferences are altered.^ Obviously, not all institutional
changes determine a modification in.the equilibrium party structure; .however, it is important
to emphasize the possible role of such changes.•
Besides the explicit introduction of party formation and the possibility of comparing the
effects of different electoral systems on equilibrium outcomes, this paper also provides some
innovations in the way the ex post game is treated. This game among the elected members
^Italy is an example,where twice in the last 50 years. the party structure has changed dramaticcJIy-due to
two difTerent structural breaks. After World War II a major institutional mutation occurred, and the party
structure altered accordingly. In 1992, following (1) a change in theelectoral system (towards majoritarianism);
(2) a relaxation of the constr^nts against forming coalitions with the former communists after 1989; and (3)
a corruption scandal, which changed voters' preferences, a huge renegotiation process on parties started, and
has not ended yet. A tendency towards a reduction of the number of parties (or joint lists) can ak-eady be
noted. See Laver &Shepsle (1996) for otherexamples. ^ . ' , .
of Parliament has been studied extensively in the literature, and most of the work on this
topic uses the non-cooperative sequential bargaining model of Baron k Ferejohn (1989) as
a basic tool. The model of majoritarian bargaining used in this paper has more predictive
power than the other models in the literature.'* The legislative majoritarian bargaining stage-
game is modelled here as a non-cooperative sequential demand game, inspired by the work of
Selten (1992). The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium payoff allocation of the game is consistent
with the empirical finding that, within the majority coalitions or the cabinets, ministerial
payoffs and private benefits (like extra-ministerial patronage) are distributed proportionally
according to the relative bargaining power given by the distribution of seats. In contrast,
Baron & Ferejohn's model puts too much emphasis on "proposal power," i.e., the first mover
in the order of play gets a disproportionate share, which is not confirmed by experimental
evidence. In our model, when politicians have lexicographic preferences, the equilibrium
distribution of payoffs within the winning coalition does not def)end on the order of play.
Another important feature of the sequential demand game used here is that there is a unique
SPE distribution of payoffs for every distribution of seats, and hence it is possible to assign
an expected payoff to each and every party for every party structure. This mapping allows
us to study the incentives for party formation ex ante. With different electoral systems the
same party structure can map into different distributions of weights, and hence different
distributions of payoffs. Therefore the incentives for party formation will be sensitive to the
choice of the el^toral system.
Duverger^a hypothesis is formally proved with our model. All the previous formal expla
nations of Duverger's law and Duverger's hypothesis refer to strategic voting.^ This paper
shows that strategic voting is not necessary to obtain those conjectured relationships between
electoral system and incentives for party formation.
As far as the equilibrium policy outcome is concerned, the relative performance of the two
systems is very sensitive to the preference orderings of politicians, and whether the "action"
takes place before or after the election has repercusions on the "ability" of the various types
of representative democracy to reproduce the outcome of direct democracy:
1. If politicians care primarily about private benefits (lexicographic preferences), then the
proportional system determines an equilibrium policy outcome that coincides with the
median party's platform (and hence, if the median party's position is the same as the
^SeeMorelii (1998a) for some robustness results on our prediction for majoritarian bargaining.
^This indicates the conjecture that the number of parties is always greater when the electoral system is
proportiona] than when it is pluralitarian.
®See Cox (1997), Feddersen (1992), Fey (1997), Palfrey (1989).
median voter's position, the outcome of direct democracy is obtained). The propor
tional system allows'the median paHy to obtain the majority vote on: her preferred
policy outcome because transfers cannot be used'for compromises in-this case, i
2. If instead politicians have quasilinear utility functions, an explicit trade-off exists be
tween the two dimensions; thus, the equilibrium outcome of a parliamentary system
with a proportional electoral system is the fruit of a compromise, and, is therefore
bounded away from the median voter outcome.
3. If the electoral system is pluralitarian cthe equilibrium outcome", depends-almost-exclu
sively on=the ex ante bargaining power of the political elites at the party formation
stage, and the preference orderings matter much less. With respect .to the proportional
system, the equilibrium outcome under plurality .rule. is~always.(at least weakly) more
distant from the median voter position when preferences are lexicographic, while it
might well be closer in the quasilinear case.'i. s i if . .
The paper is organize ^ follows: in'sectiori 2 wed^cribe the model; characterizing each
stage of the game and defining formally the role of an electoral system; section 3 contains
the main results for the case where politicians care priniarily about private benefits; section
4 displays all the equilibrium implications of the model for the quasilinear case, and section
5 concludes. All the.prpofs,are |n the appendix.
• " . .-ij 'j
2 The Model ; ,
2.1 Basic Assumptions.'
Consider a set P of "political elites" (i = 1,2, ...,p), the initial 'players of the game, and
assumep > 3. Each player i is characterized by a "position" on the policy space [0, l].'^ The
p players form n coalitions, (Cv/Cq,': .C„ : Ck DCj = 0, U?=i = P). Such n coalitions '
are the parties that face elections.® Party ,i's position is denoted by 6{ and is a weighted
average of the positions held by the members of the party. Formally,,
o _ ^j€Ci
^In this paper we consider {only, one'dimension. >The extension to a multidimensional setting will be
considered in future work. •
^CaUing'political elites, the players-at> the ex ante stage and parties the actual players from the election
stage on, is only a convenient distinction. In some contexts the initial players are actually parties themselves,
and the actual players from the election stage onarejoint lists; but the strategic interaction between the two
stageswould be exactly the same, so we will stick to the terminology in the text.
where Vj denotes elite fs relative ex ante bargaining power V'j = 1)'® We assume
throughout the whole paper that for every possible partition tt (into n parties) of the initial
players' set P, there is perfect foresight; every elite is able to solve the game in the same
way. Voters (a continuum) are characterized by a distribution of preferences over the same
policy dimension [0,1], and they are divided into districts (or constituencies). Knowing the
ex ante bargaining power ipi and the ideological policy position 6i of each elite i, voters
know the policy position of every party that might form, and since no contingent contracts
can be signed, the true position of parties is the only relevant information for voters. For
any configuration. (1) of the n-dimensional vector of positions and (2) of the distribution of
voters' preferences, the electoral system determines a distribution of seats in the Parliament.
Finally, for every distribution of seats there are expected payoffs for the n parties. These
payoffs come from the majoritarian bargaining game that they have to play in order to try
to enter a coalitional government.
Once the elections have determined a distribution of seats in the Parliament, the actual
players of the game become the n parties, given the following loyalty assumption:
Assumption 1 The parties represented in the Parliament can form coalitions but they can
not break apart. Party members in Parliament are loyal to the party leadership.^^
For each possible distribution of seats among parties, every party assigns the same proba
bility distribution to the possible winning coalitions and to the possible payoff distributions.
So, every party that went to the elections has, after the election results become known, an
expected payoff. Before showing how those expected payoffsare determined and before show
ing what the derived incentives to form parties in the first place are , let us formalize the
notion of an electoral system.
2.2 Mathematical Definition of Electoral Systems
There are z constituencies, or districts, and C seats in the Parliament. For simplicity, we
make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 The list of possible parties to vote for is the same in every constituency.
®One example of a possible measure ofrelative exante bargaining power could be t/ij = tyj(p), the expected
percentage of votes that elite j would have if n = p.
^®This assumption has strong empirical support in parliamentary democracies, while it would obviously be
a very strong one in presidential-congressional systems like the U.S. See Persson and Tabellini (1998a) for a
clear recent discussion on this issue.
Given assumption 2, we can provide a general definition of an electoral system.
\ '
Definition 1 An electoral system is a ^-touple composed of:
•• ;2, • '• I'.; '"v" li" ) > •> .1 ' III",'' ' »
1. A set H,, the population of voters, of measure Ur = 1;
' I •' il ' .... .1 i--*. . > 1, ,
2. A partition ofTZ into z subsets (Ri)isii,...,2 (Ri has measure //{, with = iur = ly).'
3._ A function pji Ri [0,1] (thefraction of votes going to party j in district i);
4. A function Fj : [0,1]^ —¥ [0,1] (fraction of seats for party j).• -1 •
<^ Geometrically, one could also thinkjof the domain ^ a rectangle, divided into 2 rectangles,
where the area of each small rectangle represents the popiila'tion of voters in a district. Voting
in each-district 'can be defined .as an'assignment of;a'fraction of votes E"-! p*- = .l)..for
everydistrict i.and for every .party j, j = The first-three, components of the 4-touple
in definition 1 are clearly common to every electoral system, and hence in the analysis of the
proportional vs. pluralitarian system .we-can cohcentrate-on the last element. '
•' .} . '
2.2.1 The Proportional System
The proportional system is characterized by the function:
z •
Wj = Fj(n) = Y.V'jt^i (2)
' i »=i
The fraction of seats Wj is a weight, which determines the "bargaining endowment" of party
j in any weighted majority game to be played in the Parliament after the elections. It is
obtained as a weighted sum'of the results oiF each (district', where each district's weight in the
overall sum depends on the relative population size.^^ -
^ ' s *
J
2.2.2 The Pluralitariau System
•'1/ ' • • ' ' •! ••'i
We call pluralitarian system a system characterized by the function:
=^3 {9, m) =£ ,- ., , (3)
•'1=1
Cis much bigger than n (many Parliaments have huge numbers of representatives) the .fact that we
consider for simplicity all possible real numbers as possible fractions^ of seat's is not too' bad an approximation,
but it is indeed an approximation.' • .1. . ' 1 1" • '
6 ••
where ' ' ^ '
g)= 1
d otherwise .
Party j has to win in at least one district in order to haveseats. The fraction of seats going to
each party j depends on how many districts party j wins in, and on the relative importance
of those districts. ' > "
One way to model mixed systems is to imagine that a fraction t] of the Cseats is assigned
proportionally and the rest following the pluralitarian rule. In this way the fraction of seats
obtained by party j is as follows:, .
• \ /A • \
•• Wj~r} +(1-??) (4)
\»=i / \»=i /
These intermediate cases are observed in the real world, together with runoffs and percentage
lowerbounds. We ignore them here for simplicity. They will be introduced in future work.
!;
2.3 The after-elections Majoriteirian Bargaining Game
We now turn to the description of the game, starting from the legislative bargaining subgame.
Let us denote by q the quota for simple majority: g = If Wi > q for some i, obviously
there is no coalition to be formed, and every decision, including the government formation,
is taken by party i. The interesting case is therefore to assume
Wi < q Vi.
A coalition of parties 5 is a potential majority coalition if and only if ^
denotes the set of all minimal winning coalitions (MWC) given the vector of weights w.
n^W^js: Y,wi>q,'£wi<.gwcs\
I ieS i€T J
The number of MWCs in 9.'^ {w) is denoted by m(u;); M*{w) = {5 € i G 5},
and m*(ty) is the cardinality of such a set. The total amount of private benefits, or rents,
associated to being in office, are normalized to unity, and they are distributed in equilibrium
only within the prevailing majority coalition.
In the real world, parties share payoffs (ministers, portfolios, and other private benefits)
proportionally to their bargaining power, which is usually related to the fraction of seats
they own. In particular, Browne & Franklin (1973) show a strong empirical evidence that
ministerial payoffs are usually shared proportionally to the relative weight of the members of
thejmajority coalition, especially if the number of parties in such^ a coalition is large.- They
also show that if exceptions exist to such a -rule they are-in .the direction of equalisplit (i.e..
with a relatively greater share for smaller parties)-when fewer':parties belong>to the-winning
coalition. In the case of only two parties in a majority coalition the tendency-towards equal
split is the strongest. Laver & Shoefield (1990) and Shoefield & Laver (1985) provide different
accounts and data about'this phenomenon, which is known, in its simplest form.'as Gamson's
law. The predictions obtained looking at the Siibgame Perfect Equilibrium outcomes' of the
non-cooperative game defined below are consistent with these empirical "findings, and are easy
to compute. The other models of majoritariaii bargaining (including the most widely used
among them, i.e., Baron & Ferejohn 1989) do not yiejd equilibrium^ outcomes compatible
with the above. The role of the order of play and the power of the first proposer in obtaining
very large shares are overemphasized. Forexample, in any three-player majority.game where
none of them individually has more than q, the two players forming a MWC should share
50/50 the payoff of winning, as confirmed by the experimental evidence as well, while the
Baron & Ferejohn model would assign 2/3 to the first proposer.
The majoritarian bargaining' game used here is a sequential demand game, and can be
described as follows: ' ' • - ' '
1. The He^ of-State (or Monarch) chooses the,first proposer, (usually.a potential prime
minister) and the ^rest of the order of play: ,'The Head of State is-assumed to choose
the optimal order of play given.tits ,"super partes" preference ordering. In the case of
indifference it randomizes.- . t i -
2. For any order of play chosen by the Head of State, players make demands sequentially:
when the turn comes,
(a) each player i demands a share x,- of private benefits (like a reservation price for its
.1 ' ' ' • '! i/ '* • " i '• ;
participation to a majority coalition), and
(b) in addition it,makes a policy proposal y,-.
When the game arrives to a node wHere it is'"fe^ibie"' for' the player'moving at such
a node to form-a winning coalition with a'(weak) subset'of the previous movers; it can
choose to'close such a coalition, or'else it can choose to make'another demand and let
"For experimenii evidence on the fact that traditional sequential bargaining games attach too much
importance to the'power bf being firet proposer see Bolton (1991) and Ochs ^ Roth (1989).'
Randomization is usually assumed when only private benefits enter the utility function" of party members,
because in that case every winning coalition in the continuation'equilibrium of every order of play'is as good
as einy other for a "utilitarian" Head of State.' ' ' '
the game move-on. Closing a winning coalition is a "feasible'' option for a player only
(1) if there is at least one subset of the previous movers whose total payoff demands
do not exceed 1, and (2) if the parties belonging to such a subset proposed the same
policy outcome.
3. Each party movesat most once: the game ends either when some player closes a coalition
with some of the previous movers, or when all players have moved once, whatever comes
first. If no winning coalition has been formed by then, all parties get a O-normalized
outcome (caretaker government, new elections, or similar).
As shown in the next sections, this sequential demand game has a unique Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium, both when parties have lexicographic preferences and when they have a standard
utility function.
•
2.4 Voters' Preferences and Expected Payoffs
For every distribution of seats w (endowment vector of the majoritarian bargaining game)
each party i has an expected payoff u,-(uj). '^* The distribution of seats w among the n parties
facing elections depends obviously on voters' preferences. In terms of our mathematical
characterization of electoral systems, voters' preferences determine pj and Assuming
sincere voting, the knowledge of voters' preferences is sufficient to determine those mappings,
still keeping n fixed. Voters have single-peaked preferences on the policy space. Voter i votes
for the party j which has the closest platform:
min(0t —^j)^-
The Equilibrium outcomes of the game remain equilibrium outcomes even introducing some
form of strategic voting, but with strategic voting there could also be some other equilibria.
We will discuss the possible changes when needed. We keep sincere voting because the
emphasis of this paper is on the strategic behavior of political elites and parties at the
different stages of the representative democracy game.
Notice that, since the position of a party on the political spectrum is given by the weighted
average position of its components, a party Ci formed by many elites but disconnected^ i.e.,
where some other party Cj holds a position in between those held by the elites forming Cj,
could have the same policy position as party Cj and could therefore get the same number
'^The term "expected" refers to the fact that the order of play might be chosen randomly by the Head of
State, as long as the aggregate preference ordering is maximized.
of votes. This is why party coalitions are almost always connected.. In any case, given that
voters' preferences are common knowledge, every party structure ;r is associated to a unique
(n-dimensional) vector of,expected payoflfs; Given this mapping, we can now move to the
first stage, where the party structure is endogenously obtained. • '
2.5 The Peirty Formation Game i' • •
In our model the number n of parties in a given system must correspond to an equilibrium
party structure, which we now have to define formally. Suppose that there are p political
elites (finite number) who have to form parties (n < p). E^h elite i has, as mentioned above,
an associated € [0,1].
The party formation game is modeled as a link formation game. Aumann & Myerson
(1988) used a link-formation game based on Myerson's (1977) article on cooperation struc
tures. Their gahie is similar to our first stage. One important difference, which does not
concern the rules of the game, is that the subsequent stage game is described and. solved
explicitly in our model, whereas in Aumann>Myer^on the individu^ payoffs are basically a
direct exogenous function of the cooperation structure, without any modeling of what may
go on among the-components of the cooperation structure. Solving the subsequent stages of
the game, we can attax:h to aiiy party structure a vector of expected payoffs, one for each
party; but oneof the felons to study the whole game'is to show how this mapping depends
on institutional characteristics, ideology, and voters'preferences: ' ' ' "
' Let us now analyze the modeling "^sumptions. 'A graph'g (or cooperation structure, or
network) on the players' set P is a set of p nodes and a set of links (non-directed segments).
A link between i and j will be denoted by ij. A component hof& graph g is a set of nodes (all
linked to one another directly or indirectly) and the set of links connecting them. A graph
is divided into disjoint components, as clarified by the following formalizatidn: denoting by
T{h) the set of players corresporidirig to the nodes of a component" Aof a graph p;'
1. For all i,j e T{h) C F, j ^ z,,there exists a set {I'l,..., 1^-} C T{h) such that ii = i and
iK = j and such,that €.h for all k = 1,..., K\ . .
2. i € T'(/i) ahd j'6 F\T(/i) implies that ij ^ 5. '
3. ij € h implies ij € g.^^
'®The second partofthe definition is the one that guarantees disjointness. This definition ofcomponent is
taken from Curranni>& MoreUi (1998), a.work on the efficiency of cooperation structures.
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A set T(h) of players, linked in a component ft of a given graph, is called a party (denoted
by C) if every player in T{h) is linked to every other player in T{h) directly. For any h £ g,
if T{k) is not a party itself (because there are some links missing), then each player in T{h)
is a party. Formally;
n{h)= 1 if^iJ,€T{h) ij e h
|T(/i)| otherwise
h£g
and n{g) will denote the corresponding partition of the players' set in parties, or party struc
ture.
The motivation for requiring direct links among all members in order to form a party is that
the loyalty of party members in the Parliament to the party's policy platform (Assumption
1) is taken for granted by the voters only if every elite constituting the party is in agreement
with every other elite in it (complete subgraph). Otherwise, when some links are missing,
voters are assumed to believe that the party members will not necessarily be loyal. Obviously
there are many contexts in which it is very important to consider incomplete subgraphs: for
example, in the literature on communication networks it is often emphasized that when
links are costly the best way to connect the members of a component is to do so with the
minimum possible number of links. But when the subject matter is the formation of political
agreements, it is not realistic to allow some members of a party not to communicate (and
hence not to agree) with one another and yet let it be perceived as a party with a unified
policy platform.
The expected payoff for party C when the political elites are in a cooperation structure
g can be denoted by v{C\g)}^ The imputation rule assigning-to elite i an expected payoff
as function of the cooperation structure will then depend on the expected payoff v(C',g) for
the party C containing i and on ip. The vector of ex ante relative bargaining powers ip, in
fact, not only determines the party position (recall (1)), but also determines the shares of
private benefits within the party. If links are costly, then each elite i has to subtract from
the expected payoff just described the cost c{ij) 'foT every link involving i.
We now have all the ingredients to turn to the description of the game. Suppose that
at the initial node of the game the players are all singletons (ff°).^^ The players move once
^^Since v is given only for a given set of institutions, preferences, and ideological positions, we should put
all these things in .the domain of the function. The way g affects the expected utility of peirty Ci is through
the mapping that the electoral system creates from g into w, and then using Ui(w).- But for simplicity it is
better to analyze the first-stage game for a given configuration of those features of the political environment.
*^When a new cooperation problem arises, for example among countries, it is fair to assume that they start
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each, sequentially, according to some given protocol p : F —{1.2... .,p}. Each player has to
choose which arcs (directed segments) to send. If and only if i sends an arc to j and viceversa
the link ij is formed. Arcs that are not reciprocated don't count. Let us denote by a, the
action (choice of arcs) of player i; aj denotes the arc sent by i to j. A strategy 5, for player
i specifies an action a,- at each and every history where i has to move. Denoting by 2 the
player in the i-th position in p, a history for player t is simply the set of actions ai flt-i-
Every strategy profile s determines a graph p(s) and the expected payoffs attached to a
strategy profile s are obviously given by the expected payoffs associated to 5(5). Since the
game is finite the set of Subgame Perfect Equilibria is non-empty, and for a given p backward
induction implies that generically the SPE party structure is unique.
Lemma 1 If c(ij) = 0 Vijf there exist multiple SPE profiles and multiple equilibrium
graphs. However, one of the equilibrium graphs is alwaps the one composed exclusively
of complete subgraphs, without superfluous links.
2. If c{ij) > 0 Vij, the equilibrium graph g* is generically uniquefor every p, and contains
only links leading to complete subgraphs.
3. Generically, for every p there exists a unique SPE party structure.
Given this Lemma (proved in the appendix), from now on we can just talk about the
equilibrium party structure. A feature of the equilibrium party structure is that the elements
of such a partition, as already mentioned at the end of the previous section, are usually
"connected" parties. To see this, consider the following simple example: Let the electoral
system be pluralitarian, and let p = 3; let one of them have the median voter position. As
will be shown in the next section, some party formation must occur in this case, whatever
as long as none of the three players expects to win by herself. Notice that the party composed
by the elite on the left and the one on the right could never win the election against the elite
in the middle; they can at most tie. but only in the measure-zero event that the two extreme
parties have exactly the relative bargaining power that allows them to locate themselv^
exactly at the median voter position. But even in this extreme case where tying is possible,
the disconnected party never belongs to an equilibrium party structure, because winning for
sure is better than tying for anyone, and hence, whatever the order of play is, the middle
from no agreement on such a new subject, and they start building up cooperation procedures from that
time on. In the case ofparty formation it is clearly an abstraction, since a "reaP status quo would in general
already display some long-standing coalitions. Before any election however it is very common to have at least
some negotiations even within the long- standing coalitions about the policy platform to propose and the
conditions to remain together.
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player forms a party with one of the others, the one with the lower If the elite in the
middle does not hold the median voter position, then in principle the disconnected party
could win. But if political players care a bit about the closeness of the final policy outcome
to their own favorite one, then the disconnected party would not form in equilibrium anyway,
since the equivalent proposal to form a party by the middle player should always be at least
as attractive. Assuming that the cost of forming a link is increasing in the distance between
the two elites would capture most of these reasonings and assure .connectedness for every $.
We can now generalize these and other important equilibrium features of our model, starting
from the lexicographic case.
3 Equilibrium Outcomes with Lexicographic Preferences
Let us consider first the case in which politicians have lexicographic preferences: they first of
all care about their share of private benefits, and then, for any given share, they would like a
policy outcome as close as possible to their own. The Head of State is obviously indifferent
among all the possible winning coalitions as far as private benefits are concerned. On the
other hand, the probability of dissolution of a government coalition (about which all Heads
of State care) is assumed to be decreasing in the "average distance" of policy positions within
the majority coalition, and hence the Head of State chooses the order of play such that the
average distance is minimized. In other words, denoting by r any order of play chosen by the
Head of State for the majoritarian bargaining game, denoting by 5"(r), the equilibrium
majority coalition and the equilibrium policy outcome prevailing given,r, the Head of State
is assumed to choose r* such that
iG5'(r') iGS'C)
when compared with any other r. Denote by 6m the median voter position and by 0^^-^ the
position of the "median party", i.e., the party such that the coalition with all the parties on
its left and the coalition with all the parties on its right are both in (the set of feasible
winning coalitions with the median party).
Proposition 1 Assume c{ij) > 0 Vij. For simplicity, assume also that m*{w(7r)) > 0 Vi, Vtt
(no-dummy players).
If the electoral system is proportional and the politicalelites have lexicographic preferences,
then:
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1. The majority coalition S' is the minimal winning coalition with the minimum "average
distance" from the equilibrium policy outcome:
(6)
ies
2. IfS' is unique, tt* = g° (n* = p);
3. The unique equilibrium policy outcome is
r(r) = V) Vr; (7)
4. The unique equilibrium distribution of private benefits within the majority coalition
depends on and ifp^Z the two parties belonging to the majority coalition share
equally the private benefits.
The proof of the general case is in the appendix. Here we can give the intuition by
discussing the simple case of p = 3. Consider the subgame where n = p = 3. Whoever is the
first mover, it can only demand 1/2 of the private benefits: in fact, if it demands 1/2+ « the
second mover can undercut, demanding 1/2 + €- <5 (<5 < e), so that the third mover would
choose to close the coalition with the second mover. Most important, the first two movers
will also agree to demand as policy outcome. To see this, suppose that one of the two
extreme parties—say the one on the left—tries to demand something closer to its position
when it is the first mover; if the next mover is the median party it is better offdemanding her
preferred policy, since the right party would prefer that to the first mover's proposal;
if instead the second mover is the right party, its demand would again be different from the
first mover's choice, and in particular would be one closer to the median party's position, so
that the median party, playing last, would choose the second player. For all other orders the
reasoning is the same, and in all cases the median party's position is the only equilibrium
outcome. Knowing this, the Head of State would always choose an order of play with the
median party in one of the first two positions, because otherwise the equilibrium coalition
would be an unstable one with a left party and a right party pursuing the median party's
policy. If the minimum distance is the one between the left party and the median party,
those two parties will be the first two movers, and viceversa. Knowing this, and given that
c{ij) > 0, no pair ofparties has incentive to form a larger party, and hence n = 3 is the only
equilibrium number of parties.
All the results summarized in Proposition 1 d^erve now some discussion.
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1. There is no rigorous empirical work done on the ideological distance among the members
of a majority coalition in different parliamentary systems, Hut some casual observations,
among which the Italian experience after World War II, suggest that when the electoral
system is proportional, (1) coalitions are always formed tx post after the elections,
and (2) they are aJways very homogeneous. On the other hand, reforms towards a
more majoritarian electoral system force parties to make joint lists ex ante, and the
ideoi(^cal distance may be visible.
2. The fact that in a representative democracy with proportional electoral system there
are always a lot of parties in equilibrium is consistent with Duverger's Hypothesis.
This result is robust to many variations of the model. If the Head of State had no
discretion and could only apply the fixed rule of appointing as first mover the party
with the relative majority of votes,then ?r* could be different from g°, since two
parties who fear the exclusion from the majority coalition may have incentive to try
to obtain the relative majority and hence become first movers. However, even in this
case multipartism is confirmed: n* is always > 3. 5" would not be necessarily the one
of (6), but rather it would be the one with the largest of the three parties and the
closer to her between the other two; but still the two parties expecting to be called to
move first would refuse to form a larger party ex ante. If one of the two extreme parties
expects the relative majority of votes and hence the role of first mover, the median
party expects to be called second, regardl^ of who chooses the order of play, because
the equilibrium outcome is the same and there could be only more instability in making
a majority coalition with the opposite extreme party. If the median party is the one
with the relative majority of votes when n = 3, then, in the very unlikely case that
both the Head of State and the first mover are indifferent between having one or the
other extreme party as second mover, one could think that ex ante the two extreme
parties could have incentive to merge; but even in this case this would not happen: if
the median party has a policy platform close enough to the median voter's position, the
joint list of the two extreme parties would run the significant risk of actually giving the
median party the absolute majority. Even with quasilinear preferences multipartism
will be shown to be a robust equilibrium feature of proportional electoral systems.
3. The prediction that comes out from Proposition 1 is that countries with proportional
electoral system and primarily rent-seeking politicians should display a low variance of
'^ Again, think of the center-left majority list in Itedy, formed by a bimch of small and large political elites
merging in the Olive TVee and by the extreme Commimists.
'®See Morelii (1998b) on the suboptimality of such a rule.
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policy outcomes^ and such policy outcomes' should gravitate around the median voter
position (assuming that the median party^s position is-the closest to the-median voter
• one). Before the reform (towards a.majoritarian system) of 1992, Italy had basically a
pure proportional electoral system with closed lists, and the policy outcome has indeed
remained quite stable, .despite, the many government changes.^® ^From the theoretical
point of view, notice that if.the median political elite (which is-the same as,the median
party only if n = p) has a policy position that coincides with the,median' voter-position,
then our modelshows how'does a representative democracy with rent-seeking politicians
obtain the outcome of direct democracy. :v. • ^ . r. i
4. Finally, the payoif distribution predicted by our model is consistent with the empirical
findings of Browne and Franklin (1973) and others, and with the experimental evidence
on coalitional bargaining, as discussed above and in Morelli (1998a, 1998b).
• Even allowing for strategic-voting, the equilibrium described here would stUl be an equi
librium, because voters care only about policy outcomes-and here the latter is'always the
median party's policy.'Only if the median party's position is -very^far away from the median
voter's position, only in that case some forms of strategic voting would arise, but they would
not alter the qualitative result.
Remark 1 If participation to the political game is costly for the political elites, then in a
pluralitarian system the..number ^of parties facing, elections, is at most 2. - (^uyerger's Law^.
The equilibrium policy outcome, depends on the prqtocol^qf the party formation game, and
may^welLbe far awayfrom the median voter.outcome.
The proof of the statement above is trivial. Suppose that the memiiers of any majority
party formed ex ante can all benefit from participating to the elections. The players outside
such a party would decide not to run though, for any small participation cost. A party not
expecting to win would participate only ifweintroduced some uncertainty and the probability
. . '• - .• •' i. ^ A . ' i'l. "I '
of wmnmg was not 0. When the alternative party is close enough in votes it may make
sense to participate- and try. For ah equilibrium party structure to contain more than two
parties when-the electoral system is pluralitarian, the'distribution of preferences must differ
substantially among districts (as in UK seems'to be the-case,' allowing the Liberal party
rigorous empirical analysis of this issue would probably require first the'extension-'of our model to a
multi-dimendoiial setting,-and hence wehave to postpone to future research the confirmation and consolidation
of our comparative conjecture. ' ' '
^^See Cox (1997) for a detailed discussion of the implications ofcloseness.
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to survive) Otherwise, if the distribution of preferences is more or less the same across
districts, even with uncertainty it would be easy to show that the party formation game
would never lead to more than two parties. Notice therefore that strategic voting, always
used to explain Duverger's Law in the literature, is not necessary. The two-party system has
to prevail when the system is pluralitarian even considering just the strategic behavior of
political elites. Obviously, if on top of it one allows for strategic voting as well, the tendency
to a two-party system is sharpened.
Which parties get formed in the party formation stage of a representative democracy with
pluralitarian elections depends on the vector ip of ex ante bargaining power of the initial p
players and on the order of play p. For example, let p = 3 and let the left political elite be the
one with the greatest bargaining power, followed by the center one and by the right one; then,
if the centrist elite is the first mover.in the party formation stage, it optimally chooses to send
an arc just to the right-wing elite, and the latter optimally reciprocates, because the leftists
would want too large a share. The equilibrium policy outcome would then be somewhere
in between the center and the right positions. Thus, if political elites care primarily about
private benefits, the proportional electoral system is the only one allowing a representative
democracy to mimic the results of direct democracy.
4 Equilibrium Outcomes for the Quasilinear Case
It is important now to check how do our results change when using a standard utility func
tion, where parties care both about policy outcomes and private benefits.The difficulties
encountered when trying to obtain clearcut results for more than three players pushed so far
most authors to anjalyze just the three-player case. Similarly, even though for the case of
lexicographic preferences our model yields clear results for every number of players, in the
quasilinear case we prefer to avoid cumbersome computations by focusing on the p = 3 case.
I •
4.1 Majoritarian Bargaining vi^ith Quasilinear Preferences
Let the ideological positions of the political elites on the policy space be 0 < < ^2 < ^3 < 1-
Let's assume now that these three elites haye the same utility function, linear in private
benefits and concave in the distance between the realized policy outcome and the desired
^^See Laver & Shepsle (1994).
^^Most papers in the literature on legislative bargaining, including the seminal work by Baron & Ferejohn,
deal only with the pure private benefits case.
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one: • . .
u; = Xi + 1- 7(^* - 5,-)^ (8)
where 7 € [0,1] determines the weight of policy outcomes in the utility function. The total
sum of transferable private benefits associated to being in a winning coalition is normalized
to 1 as before. Suppose that the fractions of seats 'v}i,W2,103 expected by the three elites if
they remain three parties are such that Wi < q Vi. Recall now that when player i moves (in
the after-elections game) it makes a demand X{ and a policy proposal, which we denote by i/,-.
A winning coalition can be formed only if the demands are compatible and if the members
have proposed the same policy outcome. The Head'of State chooses' the order of play that
maximizes the total sum of utilities, acting'^ social-planner. -
t ' Ci" , j-v . I • .
Lemma 2 Consider three parties involved in a majoritarian bargaining game,^with policy
positions 0 < ^1 < ^2 < ^3 < 1 Q^d with a utilityfunction as in (8):
.1. If party 2 (the median party) is the first mover, then the equilibrium policy_ outcome
is 6* ~ 5i±2fz±5a. . party, 1 or party 3 is the first mover, then 0' =
respectively, 2£a±|i±®2., depends only on who isjhefirst mover, and not on the rest
of the protocol, -s ^ .
2. The equilibrium share of private benefits'for the first proposer is less than or equal to
5, and converges <0 ^ cs 7 goes to 0.
For example, if 61 = 0, $2 = 5, ^3 ='i5 then the'equilibrium policy outcome is ^-when
party 2 is the first proposer, | if 1 is the first proposer, and | if'3 is the first proposer. If
party 2 is the first proposer its equilibrium demand of private benefits is exactly | {equal
split), while if the first proposer is one of the other'two players the equilibrium demand of
the fipt mover is strictly less than unless 7 =.0.,
Themajoritarian bargaining subgame can besolved, following the same backward induc
tion technique used in the proofofLemma 2, for any.number ofplayers, and all ,the qualitative
results can be extended to the general case..Lemma 2 confirms, in contrast with most of the
results in the literature on.nonjcopperative,coalition formation, that the<first mover never
obtains more than half of the private benefits. If anything, it is the party in the middle of
the policy spectrum that gets slightly more (both in-terms ofprivate-benefits and in terms of
policy outcome), independently ofwho is the first proposer: Now we can use this equilibrium
characterization of the majoritarian bargaining subgame to analyze the impact ofelectoral
systems on the equilibrium party structure' arid policy outcome.'
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4.2 Duverger's Hypothesis and Duverger's Law
Proposition 2 Considerp = 3 political elitesand let them have quasilinear utilityfunctions
like in (8);
1. If the electoralsystem is proportional then the equilibrium party structure is = 1:2:3:
(n = p = 3).
2. If the electoral system is pluralitarian, then n = 2.
3. At the after-elections stage the majority coalition 1,3 can neverform in equilibrium. In
the pluralitarian case, which induces coalition formation at the ex ante stage, $2 ^
is a necessary condition for the party \,Z to have a chance to form for some order of
play of the party formation game.
This result confirms that a proportional electoral system tends to foster multipartism,
while plurality rules determine strong incentives to party formation before elections, reducing
thereby the actual number of parties facing elections to two. If the number of initial players
is greater than 3, then there may be some party formation going on before elections even
with a proportional system, but never to the point of reaching the two-party system.
The result that "disconnected" coalitions cannot be expected to form when the system is
proportional seems to be consistent with the stylized facts, and it is in contrast with Austen-
Smith Sz Banks (1988). Only when there is heterogeneity of preferences, for example when
different players have different values of 7, there may be majority coalitions with the two
extreme parties, as shown by Jackson & Moselle (1998).
4.3 Equilibrium Policy Outcomes
For the lexicographic case the comparison of equilibrium policy outcomes is unambiguous,
with the proportional system leading to a policy always closer to the median party's position
than the pluralitarian one. In the quasilinear case the comparison is lessstraightforward, and
depends on the relative ex ante bargaining power of the political elites. As in the previous
section, let us use the three-player case in order to illustrate the main relationships.
Proposition 3 If the political elites have a quasilinear utility function as in (8), the com
parison of equilibrium policy outcomes is as follows:
1. If the cost of forming a party is increasing in the distance between the policy positions
of the elites forming it and if ipi = 'ip2 = fpz (equal ex ante bargaining power), then
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• the equilibnum policy outcome of the representative democracy model is closer
when the electoral system is proportional than under plurality rule, for every 7.
; • • . ' 1 "• (*<"1 ! j . ' '' 'i. . ' ' " '
2. If 62 = Bmi for every vector of policy positions 0i,O2j^3 there exists a lowerbound
s^ch that the equilibrium policy outcome of representative democracy 'is
closer to the median voter position with a pluralitaridn sysiern than with a proportional
system for every ip2> i>,y'
Even though the ex ante bargaining power, of,the political. elit^ is exogenous in this
paper, one could argue that,.if O2 =^mi a veryrhigh relative,bargaining power for the median
party is very likely, since it is basically the one deciding.which party to form and .the others
compete to be with her. Therefore, in contrast with the prediction in the lexicographic case,
Proposition 3 suggests that if parties care about policy outcdmies and if the bargaining power
of the median political elite is high enough," convergence' towards the median voter outcome
occurs with a pluralitarian system.
5 :;Concluding> Remarks • -
As partis play a crucial role in the determination ofpublic.^polici^, economists should care
about the determinants of party formation and.party strategies. This is the first paper where
the incentives to party formation before elections, and the strategic coalition formation after
elections are clearly distinguished and where the party structure is one of the equilibrium
outcomes. The process of party formation has never been directly introduced in the game-
theoretic repr^entation ofparliamentary systems. Baron (1989, 1991) studied, self-enforcing
party-like behavior, but made no explicit mention of when,and,why.the number and size of
parties change.
•The second- importantxontribution of this paper-is the attempt to provide a formal model
of representative'democracy'that applies to euen/electoral system. Besley and Coate (1997)
introduced a simple model of representative democracy that is' specific to'systems using
the first-past-the^post rule, while Baron' arid Diermeier (1998) provide a dynamic model of
parliamentary systems valid only with proportional,elections. Since these two models are very
different from one another, the results cannot be'compared. None of them can'be extended
to consider'both electoral systems, nor to the explicit treatment of party formation'.-'
Our-model yields precise predictions about policy outcomes, niajority coalitions, and'
equilibrium party structure; for every electoral system. -The comparison among institutions
hinted -by our paper:'is-therefore particularly relevant for Eurbpean-'countries and-for any
country-considering'a transition or a reform'in the'electoral institutions." ' •'
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Consistently with empirical and experimental evidence, our simple model of majoritarian
bargaining in Parliamentdoes not yield a disproportionate payo^share for the first proposer,
hence reducing the impact of the order of play on payoff distribution. With this realistic
modification of the way legislative bargaining is usually modeled, and using a simple version
of a link formation game for the party formation stage, the model should also appear very
tractable and flexible. In fact, while almost all the papers in the literature have results only
for the three-player case, most of our r^ults are already generalized, or easily generalizable,
to any number of initial players. Besides these modeling innovations, the main results of the
paper concern the relative performance of the two extreme kinds of electoral system in terms
of party structure and policy outcomes:
1. We have shown that Duverger's hypothesis and Duverger's law can be viewed also,as
outcomes of the strategic behavior of political elites, rather than just as the result of,
strategic voting.
2. Since the equilibrium policy outcome when the elections are proportional is decided
within a coalition that is formed after elections, such an outcome is sensitive, as any
other outcome of any bargaining game, to the preference orderings of the parties at the
bargaining table. On the other hand, When the system is pluralitarian the majority
party forms before elections, and the policy platform of such a party depends on the
relative ex ante bargaining power of the elites forming it. Because of this different
sensitivity to political preferences in the two systems, the distance from the median
voter outcome turns out to be smaller with proportional elections if preferences are
lexicographic, but it may be smaller in the pluralitarian case when a more general
utility function determines more compromises at the legislative bargaining stage.
If reproducing the outcome of direct democracy is a valuable feature, then in a system with
proportional elections we should paradoxically hope that politicians care primarily about
their private benefits and rent-seeking activities.
Among the many extensions of this paper that one can think of, the most important
are the consideration of multidimensional policy spaces and the introduction of a dynamic
setting. The interaction of office-holding and reelection motivations with the functioning of
different institutions would probably yield some important results on the stability of coali
tions, parties, and policies in different constitutions. Using the framework proposed here,
another possible extension is the introduction of the runoff, the percentage lowerbound, the
division into districts (relevant when voters have different preferences in different regions)
and other institutional complexities, in order to obtain some more comparative results and
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to provide tools for constitutional designers. Finally, some new results could be' derived .on
policy convergence: in fact, in the-absence of contingent contracts and-commitment power,
convergence of the usual Downsian kind is less likely than- that obtained through party for^
mation. • •
Appendix
Pwof of Lemma 1. . < . ' .. : , .,i .
Clfum 1 A necessary condition for a graph g with an incomplete component h to be part of
an equilibrium, is that there must be no C{h) C T{h) such that, given V, the expectedpayoff
v(i\g) Vi € C(h) is lower than the expectedpayoff if they formed party C{h).
The proof of Claim 1 is simple: if such C{h) C T{h) existed, then the first player :in
C{h) according to p among those who send arcs (reciprocated) to players in T(h) \ C(h) can
deviate by not sending those arcs, and everybody else in C(h) would optimetlly do the same
in the continuation game. Using this Claim, let us now turn to the three parts of the Lemma.
1. Since the first-stage game is finite, existence of a SPE is not a problem. If c{ij) = 0 Vij,.
it is obvious that many strategy profiles and graphs can be part.of.an equilibrium, as there
are many profiles and graphs that lead to the same party structure tt with the same 0-cost.
In particular, we can easily show that if g' with superfluous links is a SPE graph, then the
graphg' without superfluous links (with alKcomplete subgraphs) such that 7r{g[) —ir{g') is
a SPE graph as well. The following argument suffic^:. call h € g' = g(s') the incomplete
subgraph of g', i.e., the component of g' where some direct links are missing (but not all);
the graph g' can be obtained through a strategy profile s' that differs from s' for the fact
that i does not send arcs to any j € T(h), Vf £ T{h)y at any histbry; '^^ but if s' is a SPE,
then s' must be a SPE as well, since given Claim 1 the elimination of those arcs does riot
alter the payoff perspectives of any player!
2. Suppose now that c{ij) > 0 Vtj. In this case, consider any 5 such that p(s) includes an
incomplete component h with'some superfluous links. Such, a strategy profile s cannot be
a SPE. To see this, take the first player in'p among those who send reciprocated arcs in h
according to s—call this player if i deviates by not sending any arc to any j ^ T{h), this
is a profitable deviation (giVen the positive cost of each jink) and no player .has interest, nor
a chance given Claim 1, to interfere.
could differ from s' also for some other arcs here there, and as long as links don't change theresults
are unchanged.
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3. Having shown that superfluous links can exist in equilibrium only when c{ij) = 0 for some
ij, the last thing to show is that the party structure is, in any case, generically unique. In
fsict, the only cases in which this finite game can have multiple equilibrium party structure
is when some player is indifferent between reciprocating the arc of a player or sending it to
another one, or when one player is indifferent between sending an arc to i or to j: but these
cases of indifference are of measure zero, since they can occur only for a finite number of
values of ip and 0 in x [0,1]^, i.e., in the cross product of the simplex of bargaining
power with the p-dimensional space of policy petitions. This generic uniqueness holds for
every p. QED
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose n' = p > Z and let's first analyze the majoritarian
bargaining sta^e outcomes.
Whatever the order of play r, the MWC 5'(r) formed by the first players in r prevails,
and the unique SPE payoff distribution is
x-{w) =4, Vi e5-
9
where the weights' vector w' and the quota q' are the equivalent homogeneous representation
of ty, If w happens to be homogeneous itself, then the share of each party in the majority
coalition is exactly the ratio betw^n the number of votes it owns and the majority quota
(proportionality). In the case of n = 3 ^ Morelli (1998a) proves all the above, and
provides other cooperative and non-cooperative models all leading to the same prediction.^®
The most important thing to show here is that for every r the unique policy outcome
IS Suppose first that the median party is the first mover. In this case it demands
the equilibrium share and its own policy platform. In equilibrium all the subsequent
players (at least up to the point where a MWC S can be closed) have to demand their
proportional share as well, and they are better off agreeing with the median party on the
median party's policy position. To see this, suppose instead that some player i in S wants
to deviate demanding ff ^ this cannot be a profitable deviation, and leads to the
exclusion of party i from the prevailing coalition, because in the continuation game the other
'^For example, if n = 4 and w = one MWC has 5 votesand the others have 4, and hence w would
not belong to a homogeneous representation. But the vector w' — j is equivalent to tv, in the sense
that the relative bargaining power of the players is unchanged, and is homogeneous. See Peleg (1968) for a
precise definition of homogeneous representation of majority games, and see Morelli {1998a, 1998b) for more
details and examples on the relevance and robustness of our prediction on payoff distribution in coalitional
bargaining.
^^These results on payoffdistribution were obtained assuming u, = Xi. i.e., that legislators cared only about
private benefits. But obviously they extend to the lexicographic case.
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players keep asking their proportional share and ;hobody.derriahds B because it is bound to:
lose against Now suppose that some other player i, different from the median party,
is the first mover: is thercan equilibrium wh'ere-it can" propose"^ closer than to and
where such d is the equilibrium outcome? The answer is no. .In fact, suppose without loss of
generality that 6i is to the left of (^t < then,' the'first'in r who has a position
9j > ^/(7r») has a profitable deviation by demanding-^^/(^-), because.all the subsequent players
with a position on the same side of the median party's position would do the same optimally.
So, the first mover and everybody else can be in the: prevailing MWC only .if iti demands'the
median party's policy.
Given ^1 the above, the Head'of State chooses the order of play so
* - ' ' ' X * \
that .the members of the 5* defin^ in" (6)' are in the first positions, but the way this
subset of players is ordered does not matter for the outcome.Moreover, if S' (from (6))
is unique, the members of 5* know in "advance that'they will be in the prevailing MWC, and
hence none of them have incentives to merge with anybody else ex ante. By the same token,
the players who know they willrnot belong* to the majority coalition because they have a
position too distant from the median party do not want to waste resources forming a party
with any other party either. Thus, if S' is unique, n* = pis the only equilibrium -number of
parties. The only case in which some party formation can occur under a proportional system
is when 5* is not unique,".'i.e.', wheh it is not" certain"which set" of players the Head of State
will let play first. > " *
QED - V
Proof of Lemma2. Considerfirst the case in which party 1 is the first mover, and suppose. •
first that party, 2 is chosen ^ second .mover. Party Irmaximizes Ui with respect-^to X\^yi
subject to v, , -'1')'
W2(a:i,yi) > m&xu2{x2,y2) S.T. 1/3(2:2,^2) > ^3(2:1,2/1)
•v.; ' . r! .Ic • f." •
The constrained max for player2 can be written as:
+ 1- T(te - 62)^ +A[(l - 12) +1- 7(fl3 - 1/2)^ - (1 - aTj + 1- 7(«3 -
= 0 —A = 1;
V2,y2
dL2 "
dx2
Using this, the second FOC yields:
= 0= -47y2:+27.»2 r}- 2793
In the Baron & Ferejohn, type of,models the first proposer has instead a special role and an excessive
power. ' • ' •" • .' ' ~
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Substituting A= 1 and 5/2 = in the third FOC we have:
Thus, the constrained max for playerS is
"2(2:2, yj) = 3^1 + 7(^3 - yi)^ - 4.1.
Then playerl has to choose 21, yi to maximize
Ii = iii(a:i,yi) +/3[w2(«i,yi) - «2(ic^y2)]
= Ii + 1 - 7(yi - Bif + ^[l - 2xi - 7(^2 - yi)^ - 7((^3 - yif -
dLi
= 0 implies
^ = 0 implies
dxi
= 0-^0 = 1/2;
ni,2,3) = yr =
2$i + ^*2 + ^3
4
= i-.'V
2 ' 32 4
_ 1 ..[g|+4g?+g|-4gi g2-4gi ^3+2^3^3]
~ 2 ~ ' 16
_ 1 ..[(g2+g3)-2giP ^ 1
2 ' 16 - 2
(9)
(10)
So, = §.
If playerS moves second, instead of piayer2, the procedure is obviously the same. The
constraint for playerl would be
W3(®i,yi) > maxti3{i3,y3) S.T. U2(x3,y3) > «2(a^i,yi)
^3 iJ/3
The constrained max for playerS can be written as:
maxLs = 0:3 H-1 - 7(y3 - ^3)^ + A[1 - X3 + 1- 7(^2 - 1/3)^ - (1 -a:i + 1- 7(^2 -yi)^)]
X3,y3
dLs
dX3
= 0 A = l;
-o-f U"- +
5^3 „ . , ,2 (93-92)'— = 0-^ 23 = Il+7{^2-yi) -7 4—
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Thus, the constrained max for player3 is - • - -- V.
^3(2:3) ys) =3^1 +7(^2 - yi? - 7-^^ 2^^ +1-
Then piayerl has to,choose xi, 2/1 to maximize.. , - .
fi +1- 7(yi - 0if +/3[1 - 2xi -- -yiyi - - 7(^2 - yi)^ +7^^^ '^-^]
= 0implies ^•(1,3,2) = 0*(1,2,3) as obtained in (9); ^ = 0implies (10). So, if 1is
the first mover, then the policy outcome will be certainly the one given in (9), no matter
what partner'player1-has. "• ' ->•, - vi'-'"
Consider the case in which the Head of'State chooses the order 2,1; 3 (the case of 2,3,1
is symmetric). Player2 chooses.3:212/2 to maximize U2 subject to
«i(a:2,2/2) > rna^ui(xi,yi) S.T. 143(3^1,^1) > V'3{x2^y2)
>- r''i . • I,-:
maxLi = xi + l-7(yi - a:i + 1-7(^3- yi)^ -(I-X2 + 1-7(^3-•^2^)^)]
tj/i ' . 1- t
= 0 implies
dxi- • • ^
... _ ^i''+ Bz
i/i — 7,—
^ = 0 implies '^
\2
z" = X2 + 7(53 - 2/2)^
"iTa^L Vi) =^2 +7(^3'- hf - 7-^f5--|M- _j: 1.
maxLs = xz +1^ 7(y2-^ ^2)^ +-/3il;- 2x2 -7(^2'- Oi? - 7(^3^-£^2)^ +7 ~
= 0 implies-
^ =0^0=1/2;
n*fn 1 ON ^1+2^2 + ^3. "
' y .(2,1,3).—2/2—. ..s (11)
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^ = 0implies
(12)
If ^1 + ^3 = 2^2 (which happens for example when O2 = ^ and the other two positions are
equidistant from ^2) then xj = § for every 7; otherwise it is less than that and converges to
1/2 as 7 goes to 0. If the protocol is 2,3,1 instead of 2,1,3 the expressions for X2 and
"s,
are the same, just inverting the indices for 1 and ,3. Similarly to the case where 1 is the first
mover, party 2 is indifferent between 1 and 3 as second mover, while the social planner is
not: this is because the sum of utilities is in general different.^®
QED
Proof of Proposition 2,
1. Suppose n = p = 3. If party 1 is the first proposer we know already from Lemma 2,
•since xl < 5, that Ui(a:",y*) < |. In particular,
.. . .. 3 ((^2 +^3)-201)2^i(®ii2/i) - 2 3
If 2 was the second mover, it would belong to the prevailing MWC, and its indirect
utility would be , ,
.. 3 , , ^2(^1 +^3 - ^2) - ^1^3"2(«i,2/i) = 2+7 2
4^2(^1 + ^3 —^2) ~ 4^1 ^3 —((^2 + ^3) ~
yl) + 2/1) = 3 + 7
If instead the first proposer is party 2, then
. 3 ((^1 + ^3)^2^2)'^2(®2'i/2) - 2~ ^ 8
and party 1 as second mover would obtain
f » 3 (^1 + ^2^3 - ^1^2 - ^1^3)ui{x2,y2) = 2~T 2 '
. . o [(fi-^3)' +(2^2-2^1)2]W2(a:2, ^2) + (a;2i ^2) = 3- 7 g •
Comparing the two total sums we have ui(x\,y') + ^2(2^1,2/1) > ^42(3:212/2) + "1(2^2'2/2)
if and only if
4^2(^1 + ^3 —^ 2) —401^3 —((^2 + ^3) —2^i)2 + (61 —03)2 + (2^2 —20i)2 > 0
there is a cost of keeping coeditions and such cost is increasing in the distance of ideological positions
of the members, then the first mover would not be indifferent either.
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or,' i • X • . ' •> - - ' •- .
- • . - 2M3--^2+^1-2M3>0 ,
"" Adding and subtracting ^1'this becomes ' ' '
—(,^3 —^ 2)^ Hi (^3 ~
which is always true because 62 >'Oi- All this implies'that between orders 1,2,3 and
'2',l,3the social planner prefers 1,2,3.'Symmetrically, one could show following the
samesteps that the social planner prefers 3;2,1 to 2,3,1. Finally, i, 3,2 and- 3, l,-2 can
• be proved in pretty fniich'the same way to'be strictly 'dbminated by all the-four options
above. Thus, the social planner will always choose to place party 2 second in the order.
Thexhoice between order 1, 2,3 and 3,2,1 obviously depends on the distances.$2 —Oi
and^3 —^2«_ The of State chooses ,1,2,3 over 3,2,1 iff
As a result of all.the.aboye, party 2 knows that it-will belong to the MWC in any case.
Whoever between 1 and 3 has the closest position to 62 knows.it will be the first mover
and. that will belong, to the MWp for sure as .well. Then, since two players are not
willing to form a majority partywith anybody ex ante, the equilibrium, party structure
is the three-party system.
2. If the system is pluralitarian, on the contrary, n = 3 cannot be an equilibrium number
of parties: in fact, if n = 3 then all the seats would go to the party with the most votes
and hence the other two players have incentive to merge. If 62 = then, depending
on the exogenous order of play of the first stage game, either 1 forms a party with
2 or 2 forms a party with 3. The party 1,3 does not form because at most it would
have probability 1/2 of winning, while the other two possible pairs lead to victory with
probability 1. If ^2 7^ then there are parameters' values such that party 1,3 could
form in equilibrium, but only if, in addition to having probability 1 of winning, c(13)
is not greater than c(12) nor than c(23).
QED
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume, without loss of generality, that 62-9i < ^3 - ^2, so that
the equilibrium order of play of the legislative bargaining game is, as shown in the proofof
Proposition 2, 1,2,3.^®
^®This happens if the proportional system allows the three parties to reach that stage, each of them.with
toi <g. , - • , . • , . -
28
1. Suppose first that ipi = ^2 = V's- In this case, recalling the assumption that the
cost of forming a party is higher when the distance between the members is greater,
the equilibrium policy outcome with a pluralitarian electoral system is either or
Qn the other hand, we know from Lemma 2 that the equilibrium outcome with
a proportional system is With a proportional system the distance from the
median party's position is therefore jf the outcome with a pluralitarian
system is , the distance from the median party's position is that is always
greater than if the outcome is the assumption that 02 - Oi O3 ^ 62
once again guarantees that the distance from the median, party's position is lower in
the proportional case.
2. If 62 = ^mi the disconnected party 1,3 can never form in equilibrium, and hence the
equilibrium outcome under a pluralitarian system is either or
The distance between the equilibrium outcome of a representative democracy using a
pluralitarian electoral system and that of direct democracy tends to 0 as ^2 goes to 1,
recalling that +il>2-\-i>3 = !• Thus, if 62 ^ which implies that the equilibrium
outcome under a proportional system does not coincide with Om, there must exist 3^^
such that V^2 > pluralitarian system leads to an outcome closer to the median
voter outcome than under a proportional system.
QED
'The equilibrium outcome is the former for sure if ipi < ^3 and c(12) < c(23).
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